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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-VENUE OF CORPORATIONS-INAPPLICABILITY OF 28 
U.S.C. §139l(c) TO REMOVAL ACTIONS - Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, 
brought a libel action in a Florida court against the publisher of Look, an Iowa 
· corporation. Defendant maintained no office in Florida, and sold its magazines 
to two independent wholesale companies for distribution to . Florida retailers; 
it was on an agent of one of these wholesalers that process was originally served. 
However, defendant did employ a "circulation road man," who traveled through-
out several states including Florida to check retail outlets for complaints and to 
see that proper displays were maintained. Defendant removed the action to the 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court issued 
an additional summons, which was served on the circulation road man, and 
quashed the original state court service.1 The case was then dismissed on the 
128 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1448: "In all cases removed from any State court ••• 
in which one or more of the defendants has not been served with process • • • or in which 
process served proves to be defective, such process or service may be completed or new 
process issued in the same manner as in cases originally filed in such district court." 
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ground that the court had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1391(c),2 since 
defendant was not doing business in the Southern District of Florida. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affinned.3 But on certiorari, held, 
reversed. Section 139I(c) relates to venue, not jurisdiction, and is inapplicable 
to removal actions; under 28 U.S.C. §144l(a),4 venue was properly laid in 
the Florida district court. Justices Burton, Black, and Jackson, dissenting in 
part, agreed as to venue but felt that the court should have decided whether or 
not defendant was doing business in Florida. The latter two urged an affirma-
tive answer and emphasized in this respect the statutory codification of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens contained in 28 U.S.C. §1404(a).5 Polizzi 
11. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 73 S.Ct. 900 (1953).6 
The proper venue of a removal action is the district court for the district 
which includes the place where the action in the state court is pending, ir-
respective of whether a corporate defendant is doing business in that district. 
This is a proposition so well established that the necessity for its reiteration by 
the Supreme Court seems rather surprising. The unmistakable language of 
section 144l(a), the writers,7 and previous decisions of the Supreme Court8 
all are in accord on this point. Doubtless the error of the courts below is ex-
plained by the resemblance of the instant case, in which effective service first 
occurred after removal, to an original action. Nevertheless, whether or not 
defendant was "doing business" in Florida remained a crucial issue, not as to 
venue, but as to the ability of the court to assume jurisdiction over defendant.9 
In declining to decide this question, on the ground th~t defendant had failed 
to contend that the due process requirements for allowing the exercise of juris-
diction over a foreign corporation10 had not been met, the majority appears to 
2 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §139l(c): "A corporation may be sued in any judicial 
district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and 
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue 
purposes." 
3 Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., (5th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 74. 
428 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l44l(a): "Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place where such action is pending." 
5 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l404(a): ''For the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought." 
6 Petition for clarification of opinion denied 345 U.S. 988, 73 S.Ct. 1128 (1953). 
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas did not participate in the principal case. 
7 MooRE, CoMMENTAl\Y ON nm UNITED STATES JUDICIAL Com: 199 (1949); 1 
BAimoN AND HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PBACTICE AND PROCEDURE §101 (1950). 
s Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653, 43 S.Ct. 230 (1923); General 
Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 43 S.Ct. 106 
(1922). 
9 See 1 BAimoN AND HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PBACTICE AND PROCEDURE §179 (1950). 
10 I.e., that it be "doing business" in the state within the meaning of the doctrine 
expressed in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 
(1945). 
454 MrcmGAN LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 52 
have been technically correct. Although no distinction is usually drawn between 
the statutory venue and the due process meaning of "doing business,"11 these 
concepts do seem to be somewhat different, at least as applied to cases in which 
plaintiff's cause of action arises from an act of defendant committed in the state 
of the forum.12 Yet the opinion of the court of appeals gives no indication that 
it recognized any such distinction; consequently, it is highly probable that that 
court's decision on remand will be unchanged. Thus as a practical matter there 
is probably an element of truth in Justice Black's remark that the result of the 
court's decision is that "the case goes back for reconsideration of the same old 
'doing business' question that has been hanging :6.re for three years."13 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the principal case is the minority's 
contention that the codi:6.cation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
section 1404(a) gave "an anachronistic Havor, a sort of irrelevance"14 to de-
fendant's argument tha,t it was not doing business in Florida. The theory 
.behind this statement appears to be that in determining the jurisdiction of a 
federal court over a foreign corporation15 the same issues are presented under 
the International Shoe Co.16 approach, with its emphasis on "balancing the 
inconveniences," as arise under a plea of forum non conv~niens. Therefore, 
if there is a minimum physical corporate intrusion into the state on which to 
predicate jurisdiction, arguments as to the balance of the conveniences are to 
be considered as· requests for transfer under section 1404(a) and not as attacks 
on the jurisdiction of the court. In reply,. it might be said that the factors to 
be considered under the International Shoe Co. case are actually somewhat dif-
ferent from those involved in the forum non conveniens problem.17 And, of 
course, under the minority's theory the question of what constitutes a sufficient 
physical intrusion would still have to be faced. Yet in application this approach 
would have at least one advantage-that of leaving to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge the often difficult decision as to the balance of the conveniences, 18 
n As representative of the many federal cases apparently failing to make this distinc-
tion see Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Pub. Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 906. 
12 In this situation due process standards may well be somewhat less stringent than 
venue ones. See Joiner, "Let's Have Michigan Torts Decided in Michigan Courts," 31 
M:rCH. ST. B.J. 5 (Jan. 1952). For an analysis of the confusion surrounding the question 
of the place of the liability-creating act in the principal case see Prosser, "Interstate Pub-
lication," 51 M:rcH. L. REv. 959 (1953). 
13 Principal case at 669. 
14 Id. at 670. 
15 A foreign corporation is not amenable to process even in a federal court unless it is 
"doing business" in the state in which the federal court is located. 2 MooRB, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, 2d ed., §4.25 (1948). 
16 Note 10 supra. 
17 E.g., a matter such as the condition of the court's trial calendar is considered in 
making the forum non conveniens decision but not the due process one. See 51 M:rCH. L. 
REv. 298 (1952). 
18 Decisions under §l404(a), not being "final," are not appealable, but are usually 
subject to review through use of the extraordinary writs; however, the decision of the trial 
judge will not be disturbed unless an abuse of his discretion is found. Ford Motor Co. v. 
Ryan, (2d Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 329, cert. den. 340 U.S. 851, 71 S.Ct. 79 (1950). 
But cf. All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, (3d Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 1010. 
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a matter regarding which the appellate courts are unable to lay down any 
definite standards. But whatever the merits of this theory as applied to cases 
in which the original jurisdiction of a federal court is in question, it would 
seem to be inapplicable to removal actions. Since federal removal jurisdiction 
is normally considered derivative, the problem in the removal cases is whether 
the state court had jurisdiction, and the federal forum non conveniens statute 
would seem to have little bearing on this issue.19 Putting these procedural 
complexities to one side, however, it may be that the real significance of the 
minority's contention is simply that it is indicative of a growing judicial im-
patience toward jurisdictional defenses raised by corporations whose activities 
are in reality nation-wide in scope and effect. 
George B. Berridge, S.Ed. 
10 Because of the necessity for subsequent service under 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 
§ 1448, it is not clear whether the jurisdiction of the federal court in the instant case could 
be considered original for present purposes. 
